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Dworkin: Ronald Dworkin

CORRESPONDENCE
To the Editors:
I was unable to review my contribution, Why Efficiency?,1 to your
recent symposium 2 after it was set in print. I now find that what should

have been the last two sentences of the postscript, beginning on page
572, were actually set forth at the end of the essay, on page 590. I hope
readers were not confused.
I also believe that I may have misunderstood two remarks in Professor Posner's symposium contribution, 3 by taking them to be more powerful claims than they were, and so criticized them wrongly. My misunderstandings in no way affect the argument I made against Posner's account
of the moral bases of efficiency, but might be irritating nonetheless. I argued that Posner had confused the different concepts of self-interest and
consent, and then I suggested (entirely independently of that argument)
that some explanation of why he was confused about this might be found
in his claim that if someone buys a lottery ticket and loses he has
consented to the loss. 4 I made heavy weather of this last claim, suggesting
that someone who bets does not consent to losing. But what Posner must
have meant (as I now see) was only that someone who buys a ticket
consents (if he knows what he is doing) to have the question whether he
wins or loses decided in accordance with particular rules, namely the
rules of the lottery. 5 If so, then I withdraw my objection to his statement
(though I become more puzzled why he thought that that unexceptionable
statement figured in his argument about hypothetical consent) and fall
back on the other suggestions I made about why he was led to the deeper
confusion between consent and self-interest.
In the same context, I considered Posner's statement that if someone
buys land which falls in value because a large plant moves from the town,
he has been compensated in advance for the loss because it was reflected
in the purchase price.- I thought that this was an argument why the law
should allow the loss to fall on the buyer in that case, and I said it was a
poor argument to that effect. 7 But perhaps Posner meant only that since
1. Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. Rhv. 563 (1980).
2. Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485
(1980).
3. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487 (1980).
4. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 574-77.
5. See Posner, supra note 3, at 491-92.
6. See Posner, supra note 3, at 492.
7. Dworkin, supra note 1, at 576.
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everyone assumes that the law is settled that the buyer must bear the loss
if it occurs, the purchase price reflects the buyer's risk of that loss. Once
again, I am puzzled about the bearing of his point, if that interpretation is
correct, on his larger argument as a whole, but I withdraw my objection
to the point itself.
Ronald Dworkin
Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford
University; Professor of Law,
New York University
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